In this paper we examine the dynamic resolution of technological adoption in \hard-ware/software" systems. We are interested in determining to what extent software availability a®ects hardware sales and/or vice-versa. We¯st develop a dynamic model for estimating demand when costs (and hence prices) are declining over time. We then estimate it empirically for the case of compact disc players. We¯nd that there is \two-way" feedback between hardware and software for compact disc players. The result that the availability of compatible software (the CDs) plays a signi¯cant role in determining the adoption of compact disc players is likely due in part to the fact that compact disc players were not compatible with any existing audio standard.
1. Introduction
Objective of Paper
In this paper we examine the dynamic resolution of technological adoption in \hardware/software" systems. Such systems abound in consumer electronics; examples include television sets and programming, CD players and CD's, and video-game systems and video games. Our objective is to formulate a model of the evolution of such systems, focusing on two features: (i) the interdependence between the hardware and software components of the system, and (ii) the presence of technological progress. We then estimate the model, using data on the CD industry.
For many systems, software and hardware products are produced by di®erent¯rms.
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Hence when a new hardware technology becomes available, consumers and software developers play a \waiting game". Consumers hesitate to adopt the new hardware (which involves a sunk investment) until it is clear that there will indeed be a su±cient variety of software. Similarly, software¯rms hesitate to develop compatible software (which also involves a sunk investment) until a su±cient number of consumers have adopted the new technology. This creates interdependence between the timing decisions of consumers and software developers: When (or whether) a consumer decides to purchase hardware depends on when (or whether) software developers make their products available for sale and vice versa. Another important feature of hardware/software systems is the presence of technological progress. In the CD industry this is re°ected in declining product prices and in increasing product quality. Given this fact, an important determinant of the timing decision of consumers is how much progress has already been made and how much more progress is expected to be made in the future. Likewise an important determinant of the timing decision of software developers is how costly it is to put a new variety on the market now vs. how costly it will be to do so in the future.
Our formulation is based on these two considerations: We view the di®usion of a new system as driven by the rate of technological progress of its components and by the interdependence between them. This formulation raises several empirical issues: One issue is to disentangle the e®ect of technological progress from the interdependence between software availability and hardware adoption. A second issue is to quantify these e®ects, determining thereby whether increases in software availability lead to more hardware sales, whether increases in hardware sales lead to greater software availability, or whether there is twoway feedback. The empirical part of our paper addresses these issues in the context of CD systems.
The CD industry provides a good \case study" for our purposes because when CD's werē rst introduced they were not \backward compatible" with any existing audio technology. In other words, a consumer could not play a vinyl record or a cassette on a CD player (or{vice versa{play a CD on a turntable). Consequently, in estimating the evolution of the CD industry, we are able to focus on the e®ect of technological factors and the interaction between the two sides of the market, while avoiding the e®ect of a pre-existing installed base of software.
Our main empirical¯nding is that there is two-way feedback between hardware and software. This result is due|in part|to the fact that pre-existing software was nonexistent, so that software was indeed as much of a \bottleneck" to the di®usion of hardware as the di®usion of hardware was to the development of software.
Interestingly, this result no longer holds if we ignore the theoretical structure and try to establish the direction of the causality links by running a \Granger Causality" test. Using that approach, software availability causes hardware adoption, but not the other way around. The \Granger Causality" result, that increases in hardware sales do not lead to increases in future software supply, is not consistent with casual empiricism.
Two related contributions of the paper are as follows. First, the methodology we develop might be useful for public-policy analysis regarding the bene¯ts of backward compatibility for other systems. A topical example is high-de¯nition televisions (HDTV). Recently, the FCC set down the guidelines for a new digital television standard, which is essentially incompatible with the existing analog (NTSC) standard. There is, however, the possibility of adapters in both directions; NTSC televisions will be able to view new broadcasts with a \down-converter" box, which will provide a somewhat improved image at an estimated cost of 300 dollars. New HDTVs will be able to watch old NTSC programs if they have a second (analog) tuner built-in; these televisions will begin with at least a 1000 dollar premium over similar sized NTSC television sets. Our methodology (suitably applied to the TV industry) could be useful in predicting the pace of adoption of the new digital technology. The speed of adoption has some rami¯cations, as the FCC has scheduled an end to NTSC broadcasts by the year 2006.
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Another contribution of the paper is in the area of¯rm strategy. It is often claimed that high-tech¯rms can enhance their pro¯ts by subsidizing the adoption of their technology{ when it is¯rst introduced. In this spirit, the Netscape browser and other Internet software is or was disseminated free of charge to early adopters; similarly, Sony entered into the production of software although its comparative advantage is in hardware. Our results illuminate the logic behind these business strategies. Given our estimates we are able to determine the elasticities of hardware sales with respect to hardware prices and with respect to software availability. We show that these elasticities decline over time. Thus, for¯rms introducing new system standards, subsidies would indeed be most pro¯table at early stages duced, the FCC imposed the adoption of a standard which enabled Black and White (B/W) television-set owners to receive color programming (albeit in black and white) and, symmetrically, color-television owners to receive B/W programming. Consequently, the software side of the market (television programming) was not as crucial. In such a setting, we would expect the purchase of hardware to cause the development of software, but not vice versa. Indeed, one article in the popular press (TV Guide, September 9, 1961) noted that consumers \broke the logjam"(page 20) and adopted color television sets, spurring the networks to begin producing color programming.
3 See \HDTV: How the Picture Looks Now," Business Week, May 26, 1997, and \Should you Roll Out the Welcome Mat for HDTV?" The New York Times, April 27, 1997.
of the industry.
The paper also makes a methodological contribution; our dynamic model for estimating demand (technology adoption) is applicable even when there is no complementary software industry as long as costs (and hence prices) are declining over time. In our setting, consumers explicitly trade-o® the lower prices which will result from waiting one period to purchase with the loss of one period's services from the durable product. We believe that this methodology can be employed in order to estimate dynamic models of technological adoption for computers and other high-tech products where quality adjusted prices are falling over time.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next subsection we provide a brief review of related literature. In section 2 we set up the theoretical model. In section 3 we describe the data. In section 4 we estimate the model; this section includes a comparison between the actual and the estimated evolution of the industry and a comparison with Granger-Causality tests. In section 5 we determine the elasticities of hardware sales with respect to software availability and hardware prices. Section 6 concludes.
Brief Literature Review
The idea that the di®usion of a system depends on the interaction between its components and on technological factors is not new. Katz and Shapiro (1985) , (1986) and Farrell and Saloner (1985) were the¯rst to introduce these ideas in a static context using a single product paradigm. Chou and Shy (1990) and Church and Gandal (1992) extended these ideas to the context of systems, consisting of hardware and a variety of software, but their framework also employed static models. Dynamic formulations include Katz and Shapiro (1992) and Kandori and Rob (1997) ; these models, however, focus exclusively on the adoption decision of consumers and not on the software industry.
Several papers have empirically examined technological adoption of hardware/software systems. For example, Greenstein (1992) , Gandal (1994) and Saloner and Shepard (1995) all provide evidence that the value of the hardware depends on the variety of complementary software. Economides and Himmelberg (1995) estimate a dynamic model of network growth for fax machines; in this case there is no complementary product for that industry. Gandal, Greenstein, and Salant (1995) examine the adoption of a hardware/software system and focus on causation between components. However, they employ Granger causality tests, and not a structural model.
The novelty of the present paper is that it formulates a structural model and then estimates it. In doing so it ties together theory and empirical estimates, and provides a framework for quantitative evaluation of public policy and¯rm strategy.
Model Formulation

Generalities
In our model, hardware is a homogenous, in¯nitely-durable product. The market for hardware is competitive, so hardware is provided at marginal cost. We denote the marginal cost of hardware in period t by c h t , where c h t is assumed to be (strictly) decreasing in t as a result of (exogenous) technological progress.
Software¯rms are in¯nitely lived and maximize total pro¯t, which is the discounted stream of per-period pro¯ts. A software¯rm that enters the market at time t incurs a¯xed cost of capacity installation denoted F t and sells its software product in each period beginning with t + 1: We let N t denote the number of software-producing¯rms in the market in period t; this gives the amount of software which will be produced in period t + 1. Software is assumed to provide service for only a single period.
4 Reductions in F t (which are exogenous to the system) and increases in the size of the hardware installed base induce more softwarē rms to enter over time.
Consumers are also in¯nitely lived and are di®erentiated by a taste parameter, µ, which measures their eagerness to own the system. The distribution of µ across consumers is denoted F (µ), with support [0; µ], µ < 1, and F (µ) = M < 1. Consumers maximize lifetime utility, which is the discounted stream of per-period utilities. Each consumer who buys a unit of hardware at time t has a demand for software varieties (speci¯ed below) in each period beginning with t + 1.
Y t is the \installed base" of hardware in period t, that is, the number of consumers who have purchased hardware by the end of period t; this gives the size of the software market in period t + 1. Di®erent individuals buy the system at di®erent dates depending on how strong their taste is for the system (how large is their µ). Y t increases over time because the price of hardware, c h t , decreases and because of increases in software availability (N t ) and decreases in software price.
The discussion above indicates that the adoption decision of consumers depends not only on the existing variety of software available for a system but also on expectations regarding software availability in the future. Similarly, the attractiveness of providing software depends on both the existing installed base of hardware as well as expectations about future increases in the installed base. The model we develop in this section makes the assumption that both consumers and software¯rms have rational expectations.
The timing of the game is as follows. In each period, (1) some consumers make initial hardware purchases, (2) consumers with hardware purchase software, (3) some software¯rms enter the software market and install capacity, and (4) established software¯rms sell their software products to consumers. We assume that all these actions occur simultaneously. Then we go to the next period (with new values of N t , Y t , F t , and c h t ) and the same set of 4 Nothing qualitative changes in the case in which software is fully or partially durable.
actions is repeated.
In the following subsections, we¯rst describe competition in the software industry and the software entry decision. We then describe consumer preferences over hardware/software systems and the consumer adoption decision.
Software Market
Within a period, t, the per-consumer demand for software variety i is D i (p 1 ; :::; p N ), where N is the number of software varieties available in that period and p j is the price of variety j, j = 1; :::; N: We assume that demands are symmetric: D j (p 
We also assume a constant marginal cost of software production, c, and quasi-concavity of the per-consumer pro¯t function:
Given the symmetry of demands and the quasi-concavity of the pro¯t functions, there exists an equilibrium in which all¯rms charge the same price, p. This equilibrium is characterized by:
Denote the equilibrium price by p = '(N ) and let ' 0 (N ) < 0, so that the equilibrium software price is declining in the number of available software varieties; this is consistent with the properties of common spatial competition models. Furthermore, let f (N )´('(N ) ¡ c)=N . The period t + 1 pro¯t of a software¯rm is then
since (by symmetry) each software¯rm has an equal share (Y t =N t ) of the market.
Consider now the entry decision of software¯rms. If a¯rm enters in period t it pays the entry fee F t and earns the pro¯t stream (¼ t+1 ; ¼ t+2 ; :::), generating a lifetime pro¯t of
Likewise, if it enters in period t + 1 it generates a lifetime pro¯t (evaluated as of period t) of
In a free-entry equilibrium¯rms must be indi®erent between these two options. This implies:
We assume F t ¡ ±F t+1 is decreasing over time (insuring that more software¯rm enter). Taking the natural logarithms of both sides of (3) we obtain:
We return to this equation below.
Hardware Market
There is no stand-alone value to either hardware or software. Consider consumer µ's hardware purchasing decision. If he purchases in period t, his outlay is c h t and he enjoys the stream of utility (CS(p t+1 ); CS(p t+2 ); :::), where CS(p) is the consumer surplus when he pays p for a variety of software. This generates a net bene¯t of
Likewise, if he purchases in period t + 1 he generates the bene¯t (evaluated as of period t)
Let µ t be the consumer indi®erent between these two. Then, subtracting (5) from (6), we obtain c
Taking the natural logarithms of the two sides we obtain log(µ t ) = log(c
We assume that c h t ¡ ±c h t+1 is decreasing in t; this insures that the installed base keeps increasing. We now turn to the econometric speci¯cation of the model.
Econometric Speci¯cation
We assume F (µ) = ¿ µ¯1. Taking the logarithm we obtain
(2.9)
where the second equality follows by substitution from (8). Cumulative sales up to period t equal Y t = M ¡ F (µ t ). We can substitute this into (9), and obtain:
We assume, for tractability, that g is a power functions of N , g(N ) = N ½ . This allows us to estimate, in log-linear form, the consumer adoption equation:
(2.11) where¯0 = log ¿ =±¯1,¯1 is the parameter in F ,¯2 = ¡½¯1 and ² 1;t is a noise term. >From equation (4), using f (N ) = N°as above, we derive the software entry equation to be estimated:
(2.12)
, ® 1 = ¡1=°, ® 2 = 1=°and ² 2;t is a noise term. Note that ® 1 = ¡® 2 . In section 4 we shall estimate the coe±cients (® 0 ; ® 1 ; ® 2 ;¯0;¯1;¯2).
Data
Compact-disc technology was developed by Sony and Philips and introduced to the United States in 1983. In order to encourage adoption, Sony and Phillips licensed their technology quite liberally.
5 We now discuss our data:
² We obtained quarterly data on compact-disc player sales for the 1985-1992 period from the Electronics Industries Association. For reasons of con¯dentiality, this series was given as an index. The series of cumulative CD player sales is shown in Figure 1 . The index series LINSTALLED BASE is the natural log of the cumulative compact disc player sales index.
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² Price and sales series on CD players by model and feature were not available from the above source. Such data is necessary to construct a quality-adjusted price series.
We were fortunate to receive data on prices and characteristics for all CD players sold in the U.S. for the 1983-1992 period from Glenn MacDonald.
7 Using these data, we ran a hedonic price regression; a description of the data and the results are reported in the appendix. We then constructed yearly (third quarter) quality-adjusted prices and averaged over the other quarters to get the series for 1985-1992. 8 We found that quality adjusted prices fell by 36 percent during this period. We converted these to real quality adjusted prices using the Consumer Price Index.
² Our data on compact disc availability from 1985 to 1992 comes from a series of Schwann publications. Schwann guides, which are published quarterly, list all compact discs available by major music category: classical, popular, and jazz. Compact disc availability is calculated by multiplying the average number of titles per page in the Schwann guides by the number of pages in the relevant category. We then aggregate across the categories to obtain total compact disc availability. The series VARIETY, which is the total compact disc availability in each quarter, is shown in Figure 3 . The series LVARIETY is the natural log of total compact disc availability.
² Our data on the¯xed cost of capacity installation for producing compact discs (software) for the 1985 to 1992 period comes from a Harvard Business School study on Compact Discs that was prepared by M. McGahan (1993) . In her study, she cites industry estimates of the one-time cost (per unit of disc-pressing capacity per year) of installing disc pressing capacity. She provides yearly estimates for the¯rst four years and a \long run" estimate. We use the long run cost estimate as the cost estimate for \year ten" and average over the \year four" and the \year ten" estimate in order to¯ll in the missing years. We then¯ll in the quarterly observations by averaging over the quarters. We denote the series on¯xed costs as FIXED. For the case when ± = :75, the variables FIXED and LDFIXED = log(F t ¡ ±F t+1 ) are shown in Figure 4 .
Estimation
The two equation system to be estimated consists of the consumer dynamics equation, (11) and the software entry equation, (12). Since this is a simultaneous equations system (N t and Y t are endogenous), Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation will lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. In order to identify our two system equation, we need to¯nd instruments for N t and Y t . Since we do not estimate ±, we employ the cost shifter F t ¡ ±F t+1 for N t in (11) and the cost shifter c h t ¡ ±c h t+1 for Y t in (12). Additionally, we use three quarterly dummies as instruments. We estimate the full system via the general method of moments (GMM).
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Before we present the empirical results, note that from the theoretical model, the sign of ® 1 should be positive and the sign of ® 2 should be negative. Further, the sign of¯1 should be positive and the sign of¯2 should be negative. If ® 1 is positive and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero while¯2 is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, this would provide evidence that only software¯rms play a waiting game, i.e., that hardware adoption causes software availability. On the other hand, if ® 1 is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero while¯2 is negative and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, this would provide evidence that only consumers play a waiting game, i.e., that software availability causes hardware sales. Finally, if ® 1 is positive and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero AND¯2 is negative and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, this would provide evidence that both consumers and software¯rms play a waiting game, i.e., that there is \two-way feedback" between hardware adoption and software availability.
In order to perform the estimation, we chose values for M and ±. We set M = 140; 000 and ± = :75. We chose M in the following fashion. By the end of 1991, 28 percent of all households had adopted a CD player. Our index of cumulative CD sales stood at 50,000. Assuming that eventually between 75 and 80 percent of households would have a CD player, the size of the potential market (in index terms) is approximately 140,000. Our preferred choice of ± is :75, rather than ± = :9, (which might seem more natural) because it provided better results in the sense of minimizing the di®erence between the actual and predicted varieties and actual and predicted sales. Our qualitative results, however, regarding twoway feedback are unchanged regardless if we use ± = :75 or ± = :9: Hence we report results and predictions using both of these values. Note that higher values of ± will magnify the feedback e®ects and reduce the cost e®ects.
Results
Despite the fact that OLS estimates are expected to be biased, we¯rst present these regressions in Table 1 . In the case of OLS, the \cost" coe±cients have the expected signs and are statistically signi¯cant; the feedback from hardware to software is also signi¯cant, but the feedback from software to hardware is not signi¯cant and has the wrong sign.
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Software Entry Equation:
Consumer 14 When ± = :9, the feedback from software to hardware is signi¯cant with the correct sign in the case of OLS. See Table 8 .3 in the appendix. Tables 2 and 3 present the results using GMM estimation. The di®erence between the tables is that in Table 2 we employ the constraint (from the theoretical model) that ® 1 = ¡® 2 : Table 3 shows the results using GMM estimation without employing the constraint that
Comparing Tables 2 and 3 , the GMM estimation without the constraints yields much better results than the GMM estimation with the constraint. This is not surprising, given that in the unconstrained model, the magnitudes of the estimates of ® 1 and ® 2 are quite di®erent. Hence, in the following analysis we focus on the unconstrained model. Table 3 , provides evidence that in the case of CDs, there is two-way feedback between hardware and software, although the feedback from hardware to software is more signi¯cant. This is shown by the signs and magnitudes of the estimates of ® 1 and¯2: This is despite the fact that the value of ± is relatively low.
With ± = :9, the feedback from software to hardware is much more signi¯cant. Table 4 .4 has GMM estimates for the case when ± = :9.
15 This table shows that changes in ± modify the results in a predictable way: higher values of ±, the variety and installed base factors are more important and more signi¯cant; this is particularly the case for variety, i.e., the feedback from software to hardware.
Note that the \cost" coe±cients also have the expected signs and are statistically significant in all of the tables. With the higher value of ± in Table 4 .4, the cost factors are less important, but still signi¯cant. Table 8 .2 in the appendix shows that our results are quite robust to the choice of the size of the potential market by setting M = 280; 000, or twice the estimated potential market.
Consumer The appendix has TSLS estimates for the case in which the quarterly dummies are not used as instruments, i.e., when the system is exactly identi¯ed. These estimates are in Table 8 .4 for the case when ± = :75 and in Table 8 .5 for the case when ± = :9.
Consumer Table 4 .4: GMM Results with ± = :9
Multiple Equilibria and Rational Expectations
Multiple equilibria are typical when there are network e®ects or when there are complementary products.
16 Our model is no exception. Substituting the value for log N t , from (12), into the consumer dynamics equation, (11), and rewriting yields the following expression.
16 Rohlfs (1974) ¯rst discussed the issue of multiple equilibria in models with network externalities. See Shy (1995) for further discussion.
Since our estimate for ® 1 is positive and our estimate for¯2 is negative, the exponent on Y t on the left-hand side of (13) is positive. The left-hand side of the equation is a \hump-shaped" curve in Y t , while the right-hand side is constant in Y t : This suggests that for a range of Y t there can be two \non-trivial" solutions or equilibria to (13). The solution to (13) with the lower value of Y t , which we denote Y l t , is unstable, because a small increase in the number of consumers adopting the technology makes the hardware more attractive, inducing all consumers in the range Y l t to Y h t , which is the higher solution to equation (13) 
Predicted Values and Other Post Estimation Analysis
We use equation (13) with our estimated coe±cients to obtain predicted values for both installed base and variety.
18 Figures 5 and 6 are respectively plots of (i) actual vs. predicted installed base and (ii) actual vs. predicted variety for ± = :75. These series begin only in the fourth quarter of 1985, for reasons we discuss below. Note from these Figures that our model does reasonably well despite the exponential growth in the installed base.
Note from the predicted series in Figures 5 and 6 that there is a dip corresponding to the third quarter of 1988; i.e., the predicted installed base and the predicted variety actually shrink in this quarter, which is clearly not re°ected in the actual numbers. The cause of this can be readily seen in Figure 2 , showing the marginal cost and the variable LDMARGINAL = log(c h t ¡ ±c h t+1 ). From the higher curve, representing the marginal cost of compact disc players, one can see a kink in 1988; prices are falling faster in the 1988-1992 period than they were in the 1985-1988 period. Hence in the lower curve in Figure 2 , the series LDMARGINAL, rises at the kink. Sales should decline near the kink, since prices are expected to fall faster; hence some consumers will hold o® purchasing hardware, waiting for the lower prices. Empirically, our results show that the right hand side (RHS) of equation (13) actually rises due to the increase in LDMARGINAL. This leads to a predicted decrease in the installed base for one period, rather than simply a decrease in sales; the same e®ect also leads to a decrease in predicted variety. If we had smoothed the price (MARGINAL) series, these dips would not have occurred; for obvious reasons we prefer to work with the actual data.
Figures 5 and 6 can be compared with Figures 7 and 8 , which show the actual and predicted series for variety and installed base for ± = :9: Note that the predictions are better for ± = :75, especially in the earliest years. Note also that the dip in 1988 is more pronounced for ± = :9; the explanation is simply that the increase in LDMARGINAL is larger for larger ±. Figure 9 shows the left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand sides (RHS) of Equation (13) for ± = :75. The LHS of equation (13) is concave in Y t , with a maximum in the third quarter of 1985. In order for an equilibrium with positive sales to exist in a given period, the RHS of equation (13) must be less than the maximum of the LHS of equation (13). Otherwise, the model predicts that no adoption takes place. From Figure 9 , the RHS of equation (13) exceeds the maximum value of the LHS of equation (13) for the¯rst three quarters of 1985.
19 Hence, the model predicts that no consumer would have adopted CD players before the fourth period of 1985.
It is not surprising that the model predicts that no consumers would have adopted CD players before the fourth period of 1985. By the end of the third quarter of 1985, our index of CD sales stood at 700. By the end of the period for which we have data (the third quarter of 1992), this index stood at nearly 65,000. A trivially small number of CD players were purchased in the¯rst three quarters of 1985. Our model simply estimates this number to be zero for the¯rst three quarters of 1985.
A Comparison with Granger Causality Tests
We now brie°y discuss the results of Granger-causality tests. Recall that a variable x t causes y t in the spirit of Granger if lagged values of x t are signi¯cant in a regression of y t on lagged values of y t and lagged values of x t : Granger-causality tests were conducted by running ordinary least squares regressions. The¯rst regression in the following table has the natural log of installed base of CD players (LINSTALLED BASE) as the dependent variable and lagged values of the natural log of INSTALLED BASE and the natural log of VARIETY (LVARIETY) as well lagged values of the natural log of MARGINAL (denoted LMARGINAL) and the natural log of FIXED (denoted LFIXED) on the right hand side of the equation, while the second regression in the table has the natural log of VARIETY as the dependent variable with the same right hand side variables as the installed base equation. A single lag is employed.
>From Table 4 .5, Granger causality tests conclude that software causes hardware, but hardware does not cause software. The result from the Granger causality tests, that increases in hardware sales do not lead to increases in future software supply is not consistent with casual empiricism, nor with the results from the structural model, in which there is strong feedback from hardware to software.
20 This suggests that there are indeed bene¯ts from estimating a structural model. 19 The way to¯nd the equilibrium value of installed base in Figure 9 for any period is to draw a straight horizontal line from the value for the RHS of equation (13) Table 4 .5: Granger Causality Tests
Elasticities
One question of interest to¯rms introducing new hardware/software systems is how to increase pro¯ts by taking advantage of the complementaries between hardware/software systems. When adoption is not as certain as in the case of compact disc technology, an overriding concern for both hardware and software¯rms is implementing strategies to ensure that the technology is widely adopted, with an eye towards creating a de facto standard. Even under the assumption that adoption is a certainty, strategies may exist for increasing system pro¯ts. These considerations drive a variety of¯rm strategies. Many¯rms introducing new systems severely discount or give away the \hardware" portion in order to ensure future sales of hardware; vertically integrated¯rms may also discount hardware in order to stimulate software sales. Netscape Communications gave its early World Wide Web browsers away for free to increase its installed base and stimulate sales of complementary products. Nintendo sells its video game consoles at low prices in order to sell more software, for which it receives royalties from all producers.
On the other hand, hardware¯rms may stimulate hardware sales by vertically integrating into software production in order to ensure a greater variety of software. This is a strategy which is attributed to Sony, which purchased Columbia Pictures in part to avoid another Betamax debacle.
We use the estimated parameters of Table 3 to show the sensitivity of hardware sales to two variables; the variety of software and the price of hardware. Using the implicit function theorem, from equation (11) one can derive the elasticity of hardware sales with respect to the variety of software:
This series is presented in Figure 10 . Figure 10 shows that this elasticity is always positive and decreasing over time. Therefore, hardware sales are more sensitive to the variety of software in the early years, implying that an investment by a hardware¯rm in increasing software availability is going to have the greatest impact on hardware sales when the system is¯rst introduced. Also, the e®ect of hardware price reductions on hardware sales can be determined. We examine two di®erent ways of discounting hardware. First, consider a one-time reduction of the price of hardware, with no promise to lower future prices. This should have a large e®ect on sales, as many consumers will shift their purchases forward in order to pro¯t from this limited o®er. The elasticity of hardware demand with respect to a one-time reduction in the price of hardware is calculated from equation (13) using the implicit function theorem.
The second way of lowering prices is a price cut which consumers expect to last for the foreseeable future. This permanent price cut will have a smaller e®ect on current sales, as there is less incentive to shift purchases forward, but would of course still increase sales. In this case, we assume that hardware prices are shifted down by a constant proportion represented by a. Again using equation (13), suitably modi¯ed with the factor a, we derive the elasticity of hardware sales with respect to a as:
3)
The elasticity of hardware sales with respect to these price measures is given in Figure 11 . In both cases, the elasticities are negative and decreasing in absolute value. The implication is that price cuts have the greatest relative e®ect in the early stages of system introduction, when the system is relatively new. Note that, as expected, the elasticity with respect to a one-time price reduction is greater in absolute value than the elasticity with respect to a general decrease in the price level; in the former case consumers shift purchases forward, while in the latter case there is simply a general increase in sales due to the lower price level.
Conclusion
In this paper we examined the dynamic resolution of the adoption of CD systems. We found that there was two-way feedback between hardware adoption and software availability. We estimated the elasticity of hardware sales with respect to both hardware price and software availability; these elasticities show that subsidizing the price of hardware or integrating into software production can be an e®ective strategy for a¯rm introducing a new hardware standard; this is particularly true when a system is new, as the elasticities decline in absolute 21 Recall that hardware price is represented by c h t , as we assumed perfect competition in hardware sales.
value over time. These results con¯rm the intuition driving business strategies commonly used by¯rms introducing new systems.
Our results also suggest that had the compact disc players been compatible with an existing audio standard, the adoption process would have occurred more quickly because from the beginning the quantity of available software would have been large, increasing the sales of hardware. In the case of CD players this was not feasible. The question of backward compatibility arises, however, for many if not most new technologies. The digital video disc prototype, 22 and the high-de¯nition television (HDTV) standard will both be backward compatible with the existing similar technologies. Our results suggest that compatibility will quicken the adoption of these technologies relative to the case if the new technologies had been incompatible. Our methodology could be potentially important in estimating the bene¯ts that this quickening would bring about.
Appendix Hedonic Price Regression
In order to derive a quality adjusted price index for compact disc players, we employed quality and price data gathered by Horstmann and MacDonald for the 1983-1992 period. The data on price and product characteristics were gathered from an annual survey contained in the October issues of Audio magazine. Their data set contains 1700 observations. As sales data for each model were not available, we were unable to produce a quantity-adjusted price index. In order to not give too much weight to models for which few sales could be expected, we restricted the set to compact disc players costing less than 1000 dollars; this reduced the number of observations to 1291.
The results of the hedonic price regression are in Table 8 .1. We use all variables for which there were no missing observations; hence the following variables are used:
² The variable Lsnratio is the log of the signal-to-noise ratio of the compact disc player; the higher this ratio, the less extraneous noise is introduced.
² The variable Losrate is the log of the oversampling rate of the compact disc player; it gives an indication of how rigorously the player translates the digits contained on the disc into sound.
² The variable Lthd is the log of the total harmonic distortion which the player introduces when reproducing music.
² The variable Lfrelo gives the log of the lower limit of the frequency response of the compact disc player.
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² Lweight is the log of the weight of the compact disc player -it provides a proxy for portable players as opposed to stereo components.
² Finally, the year 19xx variables are the time dummy variables.
>From the regression, all variables were signi¯cant, and all characteristics except Lfrelo had the correct sign. All of the time dummy variables had a negative sign. The hedonic price index was calculated by taking the exponentiated estimated coe±cients on the time dummy variables. Table 8 .5: TSLS Exact Identi¯cation with ± = :9
